One of the challenges facing the computer science community is the development of techniques and tools to discover new and useful information from large collections of data. There are a number of basic issues associated with this challenge and many are still unresolved. This situation has led to the emergence of a new area of study called \Knowledge Discovery in Databases" (KDD).
Introduction
Today many companies and organizations are collecting and storing vast amounts of data. They have discovered that large collections of data often contain valuable patterns or rules that can help them maintain their competitive edge. The development of techniques and tools to discover valuable patterns or rules presents a variety of technical challenges. This situation has led to the emergence of a new area of study called \Knowledge Discovery in Databases" (KDD) which has attracted the interest of researchers from a variety of elds, including statistics, pattern recognition, arti cial intelligence, machine learning, and databases. Currently, the primary focus of KDD research is on issues surrounding the individual steps of the discovery process 1]. As a result, those issues that are not directly related to the discovery process have received little or no attention from the KDD research community. One issue, in particular, that has received only minimal attention is the impact of this new technology on database security.
Chris Clifton and Don Marks are two of a small number of researchers who have examined the potential impact of KDD technology on database security. In their paper, Security and Privacy Implications of Data Mining, Clifton and Marks outline several very general strategies designed to eliminate or reduce the security risk presented by this new technology 2]. Their strategies include allowing users access to only a subset of data, altering existing data or introducing additional (spurious) data. They contend that the application of such policies is most e ective in the context of speci c learning tasks. These tasks include classi cation, estimation, clustering, characterization and association 1, 3, 4] . Of special interest to the current work are the classi cation mining algorithms, which have the potential to disclose sensitive information whenever a database contains both \sen-sitive" and \non-sensitive" data 2]. Speci cally, our current work has focused upon the need to develop security policies designed to minimize or eliminate the threat presented by classi cation mining in the context of the relational data model.
A valid security policy with respect to classi cation mining is the protection of all the attribute values of a tuple whenever a tuple includes at least one sensitive, or protected, data element. That is, the tuple is entirely eliminated from the user's view. In general, such a policy unnecessarily restricts a user's access to the data. An alternative policy, which is the one we propose, is to protect only data elements that need to be concealed in order to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information through classi cation mining. This type of policy has the obvious advantage of allowing maximum use of the data and at the same time protecting sensitive information. However, the implementation of such a policy requires an accurate assessment of the data in order to determine a protected data element's risk of disclosure and the need to conceal additional data elements.
A possible assessment strategy in this case is to assess a protected data element's risk of disclosure in the context of a speci c classi cation algorithm. Then, based on the results for several selected methods, a decision can be made with regards to a protected data element's risk of disclosure. An alternative assessment strategy is to make a generic assessment of a protected data element's risk of disclosure that is independent of a speci c classi cation method. This strategy has a number of potential advantages over the former. These include:
Producing security policies that are applicable to a general set of classi cation methods. Providing insight on how to modify the protection level of a protected data element.
Reducing the time complexity of the process of assessing the risk of disclosure. Unfortunately, a completely generic assessment that is independent of a speci c classi cation method is in all likelihood an impossibility as a result of variations among classi cation mining algorithms. However, such an assessment becomes feasible when the scope of the evaluation is limited to a speci c group of classi cation algorithms and/or certain restrictions are placed on the domain of the given attributes. Of course, the realization of this condition requires the partitioning of classi cation algorithms into groups that have uniform assessment properties of a protected data element. We have currently identi ed one such group of algorithms, which we will refer to as decisionregion based.
The primary focus of this paper is on the assessment of a protected data element's risk of disclosure with respect to the decision-region based classi cation algorithms. To that end, the rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a general overview of classi cation mining along with an example to illustrate the security threat presented by classi cation mining algorithms. Section three proposes a set of security policies that when implemented have the potential to provide a high level of protection against classi cation mining and at the same time maximize access to the given data. Section four characterizes the decision-region based classi cation algorithms and describes the uniform assessment properties possessed by this group of algorithms. Section ve proposes a security measure designed speci cally for assessing a protected data element's risk of disclosure with respect to the decision-region based algorithms. Section six presents an outline of an evaluation algorithm, called Orthogonal Boundary (OB), which when executed results in the application of the proposed security measure against a relation instance. The application of the measure allows for the implementation of the security policies presented in section three. Section seven presents the results of experiments that were conducted in order to assess the validity of both the proposed security measure and a subset of the proposed security policies. Section eight brie y summaries the work presented in this paper and presents an outline of future research projects.
Classi cation Mining and
Database Security
The goal of classi cation mining is to discover patterns that classify objects, or tuples in the context of the relational data model, into prede ned classes 1, 3] . This goal is achieved, in part, through the successful completion of three speci c tasks. One of the required tasks is the selection of an attribute from the given relation. The selected attribute is typically referred to as the decision variable since its purpose is to partition tuples into disjoint sets or classes. Another required task is to generalize, if needed, the current values of the selected decision variable to form a set of named classes. Table 1 shows a generalized instance of a relation in which the values of the decision variable Mileage have been replaced by the class labels, low, med and high. The nal required task is to partition the available data into two disjoint sets, a training set and a validation set 5]. The training set is analyzed by a classi cation mining algorithm to discover patterns that are relevant to the classi cation of objects into the prede ned classes, while the validation set is used to judge the validity of the discovered patterns. Obviously, the generalizability (or predicatability) of the results are only as good as the extent of agreement of patterns or relationships between the training and validation sets as judged by the validation process.
A well known category of classi cation algorithms is the decision tree classi ers 4, 5, 6] . These algorithms are characterized by the formulation of a tree structure in which the interior nodes of the tree represent tests of a single attribute and the exterior nodes represent objects of a single class. A test on an attribute results in the partitioning of objects into mutually exclusive sets or outcomes. A simple decision tree generated from the data in Table 1 is shown in Figure 1 . This tree was generated through the application of the C4.5 software package 6].
Of course, the purpose of a decision tree is to assign a correct class label to previously unseen objects. A class label is assigned to an object by starting at the root node of the tree and advancing downward through the tree until an exterior node is reached. For example, the assignment of a class label to the tuple, (Cyl = 4 ; Fuel = e ; Power = low), results in the traversal of the path illustrated in Figure 1 as a dash line, and is assigned the class label med. It is common to refer to the logical conjunction of attribute name value pairs, corresponding to the path traversed, that de nes the membership condition of the corresponding class as its description. In some cases, it may be desirable to transform a decision tree into a set of production rules. The production rules listed in Table 2 were obtained from the decision tree in Figure 1 and were also generated using the C4.5 software package. The percentage value associated with each rule is C4.5's predicted accuracy of the rule on classifying instances that satisfy the rule's left-hand side.
We now illustrate how the disclosure of sensitive information may occur through the execution of a classi cation mining algorithm. Our example is based on Table 1 .
the data shown in Table 3 . This table is an extension of Table 1 and includes the additional attributes Id and Prod, along with the three additional tuples T15, T16 and T17. Suppose that the car company that owns the data has implemented the following security policy: \junior engineers may not access the mileage class of pre-production cars". This policy might be the result of company o cials attempting to reduce the chance that someone outside the company will learn the mileage class of a newly designed car. As a result, company o cials have voluntarily released the data shown in Table 4 to all junior engineers. The only di erence between Tables 3 and 4 is the presence of NULL values in the latter table. In this instance, a NULL value, referred to as a protected data element, protects the mileage class of a pre-production car. The Mileage attribute is referred to as the protected attribute since it contains the protected data elements; and, the attributes Id, Fuel, Cyl, Power, Prod, and Tran are referred to as non-protected attributes since they contain no protected data elements. Similarly, we refer to the tuples that contain a protected data element as protected tuples. In this case the protected tuples are T15, T16 and T17. The security risk presented in this example is the extent to which the voluntarily released data facilitates the disclosure of a protected mileage value. The disclosure of that information can be achieved through the process of solving a classi cation problem. In other words, a junior engineer may be able to correctly infer a protected mileage value through the application of a classi cation mining algorithm to instances with a known mileage value. For example, access to the rule Table 2 would allow a junior engineer to infer with a relatively high degree of con dence the protected data element of the protected tuple T15 since this tuple satis es the antecedent of Rule-2 and the predicted accuracy of Rule-2 is higher than that of a simple na ive prediction that always predicts a med mileage value (since Pr(Mileage = med) = 6 14 ). In contrast, the risk of disclosure of the protected data element in tuple T17 is relatively low with respect to the given rule set since it is assigned an incorrect class label by Rule-2.
This example motivates the need for security policies to minimize security violation through classi cation mining.
Inference Based Security Policies
It is possible to view the security threat presented by a classi cation mining algorithm in terms of the expected occurrence of an unauthorized inference 2]. Figure 2 shows a block diagram of an inference system de ned in terms of a classi cation algorithm. The inputs into the system are a set of tuples having a dened security classi cation at or below some level L and a protected tuple that contains a protected data element with a de ned security classi cation level at some levelL, whereL > L. The output of the system, referred to as a class-accuracy set, is a set of ordered pairs (d i , a i ), where d i is the i th attribute value (class label) in the domain of the protected attribute, and a i is the predicted accuracy, according to the classication mining algorithm, of assigning to the protected tuple the class label d i . the output of an inference system, the predicted accuracy values, a i , are obtained through the application of a predicted accuracy measure and in general their sum need not equal one.
We have identi ed two general criteria for assessing the output of a classi cation inference system. The rst criterion is based on a chosen threshold value. This criterion involves security policies that require predicted accuracy values to be below a speci ed threshold. The other criterion is to assess the output of the system based on a ranking of predicted classaccuracy values. This particular criterion involves security policies that require the ranked position of the protected data element to lie within a speci ed range. These two criteria are referred to as threshold and rank criteria, respectively.
The threshold and rank criteria have led to the development of four inference-based security policies. Two of the four policies, maximum threshold and maximum range, are de ned independently of the predicted accuracy value of the protected data element. Speci cally, an instance of a maximum threshold policy is satis ed for some threshold value, ", and for some class-accuracy set, f(d 1 , a 1 ), (d 2 , a 2 ), ..., (d n , a n )g, if all a i (1 i n) are less than " . In this paper, \"" is assumed to represent either an organization de ned constant, expression or function whose value depends, in part, on the desired level of protection. The other type of security policy, which is also dened independently of a protected data element, called maximum range, is satis ed for some threshold value, ", and for some class-accuracy set, f(d 1 , a 1 ), (d 2 , a 2 ), ..., (d n , a n )g, if MAX (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n ) -MIN (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n )] < ". To illustrate the maximum threshold and maximum range policies consider again the classaccuracy set, Table 4 : Voluntarily Released Data.
this particular case the maximum threshold and maximum range policies are satis ed (that is, no violation of policy) only if the speci ed "-value is greater than .8 and .7, respectively.
The remaining two identi ed policies, protected threshold and protected rank, are both de ned in terms of the predicted accuracy value of the protected data element. In particular, the protected threshold policy is satis ed for some threshold value, ", and for some class-accuracy set, f(d 1 , a 1 ), (d 2 , a 2 ), ..., (d n , a n )g, if a i < ", where a i is the predicted accuracy value associated with the protected data element. The protected rank policy is satis ed for some class-accuracy set, f(d 1 , a 1 ), (d 2 , a 2 ), ..., (d n , a n )g, if the ranked position of the protected data element is not within the range L, U], where L and U are positive integers such that 1 L U and L U jfa 1 , a 2 , ..., a n gj. We refer to the interval L, U] as the non-secure rank range. We illustrate the protected threshold and protected rank policies using the previously given classaccuracy set, f(d 1 , .5), (d 2 , .2), (d 3 , .8), (d 4 , .1)g. In this case, assuming d 1 is the actual value of the protected data element, the protected threshold policy is satis ed, implying no violation of policy, only if the speci ed "-value is greater than .5 and the protected rank policy is satis ed only if the speci ed non-secure rank range is L= 1, U=1].
We previously de ned a classi cation inference system in terms of a speci c classi cation algorithm (Figure 2) . This de nition, however, can be extended to include a general class of classi cation mining algorithms. As mentioned in the introduction, this type of generalization requires a partitioning of classi cation algorithms into groups that have common properties that enable a generic assessment of the predicted accuracy values of a class accuracy set. In the next section we characterize one such group of algorithms. Condition-2 : The predicted accuracy of assigning an object O satisfying a description d 2 D to a class C is dependent on the distribution of class label C relative to all class labels associated with the objects that satisfy d. The rst condition leads to the property that the e ective assessment of the security risk for decisionregion based classi cation algorithms requires explicit or implicit determination of the predicted accuracy values of the class-accuracy set associated with each description d 2 D. The second condition enables us to select a particular method of computing the predicted accuracy values of a class-accuracy set. In general, inference-based security policies may be applied at two levels. If it is known a priori that a particular description d will be selected relative to the protected tuple in a protected relation, then we can apply a policy just to that description. This case is referred to as the description level security policy. This form of evaluation is possible only if we wish to do the assessment for a particular classi cation algorithm. An alternative to this approach is referred to as description space level security policy. In this case, we must ensure that a chosen security policy is satis ed no matter which d is chosen by a class of classi cation algorithms.
Given the above de nitions and Condition-1, we concluded that the speci cation of inference-based security for decision-region based classi cation algorithms should be carried out at the description space level. In the following section, we propose a measure for computing the predicted accuracy values of a class- . We now illustrate the application of the measure using the description, (Fuel =e )^(Cyl = 4 ), applied against Table 1 . In this instance there are zero tuples with a low gas mileage label that satisfy the description, three tuples with a med gas mileage label that satisfy the description, and two tuples with a high gas mileage label that satisfy the description. Thus, the predicted accuracy value for low, med and high is 0.0, 0.6 and 0.4, respectively. In the next section, we present the Orthogonal Boundary (OB) algorithm, which is, in part, designed to compute the class accuracy values with respect to an arbitrary description d 2 D that might be chosen by a speci c subset of the decision-region based algorithms. 6 Orthogonal-Boundary (OB) Algorithm
The Orthogonal-Boundary (OB) algorithm has been designed for use with decision-region based classi cation algorithms that produce a speci c type of class description. In particular, we require that each description, d 2 D, be a logical conjunction of attribute name value pairs that are su cient, but may or may not be necessary. This type of description is produced by decision tree classi ers. It follows that the set of such descriptions D, with respect to a protected tuple T, is the set of all logical conjunctions formed from one or more non-protected attribute name value pairs that appear in T. We refer to this set of descriptions as the description space, D , of the protected tuple T. To illustrate the formulation of a description space, D , consider the following protected tuple: (Fuel = e ; Cyl = 4 ; Tran = manu; Mileage = null). In this case, D is the set of logical expressions: f(Fuel = e ), (Fuel = e )^(Cyl = 4 ), (Fuel = e )^(Tran = manu), (Cyl = 4 )( Tran = manu), (Cyl = 4 ), (Tran = manu), (Fuel = e )^(Cyl = 4 )^(Tran = manu)g. It follows from Condition-1 that the assignment of a class label to this tuple, by a decision-region based algorithm that produces a description space equivalent to D , is necessarily a label that it associates with one of the seven listed descriptions.
Obviously, there is no way to identify a priori the description d 2 D chosen by a classi er without making explicit assumptions about the operation of such an algorithm. Unfortunately, the number of descriptions belonging to a protected tuple's description space, D , is exponential in terms of the number of non-protected attributes. There are, however, several conditions that can be taken advantage of to reduce the number of inspected descriptions (e.g. reduce the size of the search space).
One condition is the recognition of a special set of descriptions that we refer to as \zero" descriptions. The classes constructed from these descriptions contain no tuples with a class label corresponding to the protected data element. The recognition of a zero description implies that there is no need to inspect any description that is a specialization of the zero description since the resulting class will also contain zero instances of the protected data element. Suppose that the description (Tran = manu) is a zero description with respect to the protected tuple, (Fuel = e ; Cyl = 4 ; Tran = manu; Mileage = null). In this situation, there is no need to inspect the descriptions: (Fuel = e )^(Tran = manu), (Cyl = 4 )^(Tran = manu), and (Fuel = e )^(Cyl = 4 ) Another condition that can also reduce the number of inspected descriptions is the transformation of a non-secure description into a secure description. A description is considered secure if its computed classaccuracy set satis es the chosen security policy. Based on our measure of predicted accuracy and either a protected threshold or protected rank security policy, a transformation of a non-secure description into a secure description requires a percentage reduction in the number of tuples satisfying the description with a class label equal to the protected data element. Obviously, such a reduction occurs when either the number of tuples satisfying the description with a class label equal to the protected data element is decreased, or the number of tuples satisfying the description with a class label that is not equal to the protected data element is increased. A possible transformation scheme, especially when the objective is to maximize the amount of accessible data without altering non-protected data values, is to \protect" additional values of the protected tuple so as to prevent the assignment of the tuple to the class de ned by the non-secure description. This particular solution has the added bene t of reducing the required number of inspected descriptions. Unfortunately, the protection of additional attribute values of a protected tuple T, in general, causes a decision-region based algorithm to violate Condition-1 in the assignment of a class label to tuple T. Such a case occurs in the application of C4.5's "consult" interpreter which is designed to classify previously unseen tuples based on a constructed decision tree and to output a ranking of the possible class labels that correspond to the tuple. A feature of the "consult" interpreter is its ability, through the use of conditional probabilities, to assign a class label to a tuple that contains unknown, or protected, attribute values. It is this latter feature that potentially results in a violation of Condition-1 since the assignment of a class label to a protected tuple T may not be based on a description d 2 D . An alternative scheme to transforming a non-secure description into a secure description is to protect a subset of attribute values not belonging to the protected tuple. This solution requires the protection of attribute values such that a decrease occurs in the number of tuples satisfying the non-secure description with a class label equal to that of the protected data element. The advantage of the alternative scheme is that it ensures that the assignment of a class label to a protected tuple satises Condition-1 ; however, this scheme does not support maximum access to the data. The current implementation of the OB algorithm adheres to the rst transformation scheme, the protection of additional attribute values of the protected tuple.
A third condition that can reduce the number of inspected descriptions is the establishment of an upper bound on the number of descriptions. By statically or dynamically protecting a subset of a protected tuple's non-protected attribute values, we can reduce the size of the tuple's description space. Of course, the disadvantage of such a strategy is that it does not guarantee maximum access to the data.
A conceptual version of the OB algorithm is shown in Figure 3 . A k-description represents a description de ned in terms of k attributes. Each iteration through the outer loop generates a set of descriptions that require inspection. The inner loop consists of a nested-if statement that evaluates the security status of a description. If a zero-description is faced then conceptually all specializations of that description are identi ed and placed onto the \zero-description" list. Otherwise, if a description is nonsecure then the attributes comprising the description are identi ed and placed onto the \candidate-protect" list. The non-secure descriptions identi ed at level k are transformed into secure descriptions following the inspection of all k-descriptions. The current implementation of the OB algorithm requires human assistance in performing the transformations. Speci cally, the algorithm displays a list of all non-secure descriptions at level k and prompts the user (the person responsible to set security policies) to select an appropriate set of the protected tuple's non-protected attribute values to conceal. The objective is to conceal a set of non-protected attribute values that deny the protected tuple's membership to the individual sets de ned by the k-level non-secure descriptions and at the same time maximize the amount of accessible data. The result of executing the OB algorithm is the implicit or explicit inspection of a protected tuple's description space. The inspection process ensures that all descriptions belonging to the tuple's description space satisfy the user's speci ed description level security policy.
Experimental Investigation
In this section, experiments are conducted to validate a proposed approach to establish security policies based on the proposed class-accuracy measure and their results are reported. The objective of the experiments is to test the following hypothesis: there exist a protected threshold policy or a protected rank policy applied at the description level that produces a protected rank policy at the description space level with a non-secure rank range of L = 1, U = 1]. In other words, we wish to identify a description level protected threshold policy and/or a protected rank policy that, when applied to the individual descriptions of a protected tuple's description space, results in an appropriate description space level protected rank policy. In general, the determination as to whether a speci c description space level policy has been successfully implemented must be based on an evaluation of the output from one or more decision-region based algorithms that have been applied to the protected tuple. In conducting the experiments, we restricted the evaluation of the description space level protected rank policy, L = 1, U = 1], to the C4.5 decision tree classi er. The application of the classi er is described in the next section.
We anticipate that the implementation of the description space level protected rank policy, L = 1, U = 1], will provide a high level of protection. This statement is based on the assumption that a user will assign the protected tuple, or more speci cally the protected data element, the class label that is assigned the top rank by the chosen decision-region based algorithm. In addition, the non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 1], introduces a relatively high degree of uncertainty in a user's assignment of a class label to a protected tuple. This is because, even a user who has knowledge of the fact that the implemented description space level protected rank policy is L = 1, U = 1] can only logically eliminate from consideration the class label that has been assigned the top rank by the decision-region based algorithm. Hence, a user is at best forced to make a random guess from n -1 class labels; where n is the number of possible labels.
Experimental Parameters
The execution of the experiments required the construction of several protected relation instances. We de ne a protected relation instance as a relation consisting of at least one non-protected attribute and exactly one protected data element. A relation instance that contains n-protected data elements is viewed as n-instances of a protected relation. The protected relations used in this investigation were constructed through the insertion of a protected tuple into nonprotected relation instances constructed through the execution of the Synthetic Classi cation Data Set (SCDS) program 8]. A total of four non-protected relation instances were constructed through the use of the program and each instance was produced with the parameter values shown in Table 5 . The values of an irrelevant attribute have only a random relationship with the decision variable; and, a masked relevant attribute is an attribute whose values have a direct relationship with the decision variable, but the attribute itself is not included as part of the relation.
The protected tuples, unlike the non-protected relation instances, were manually generated from randomly selected attribute values. Speci cally, six protected tuples were constructed with respect to Relation #1, six with respect to Relation #2, four with respect to Relation #3, and ve with respect to Relation #4. Thus, a total of twenty-one protected relation instances were generated. Each protected tuple was evaluated against a set of protected threshold and protected rank policies applied at the description level. The implemented protected threshold policies included those de ned at an "-value of 0.9, 0.8, 0. In order to assess the generality of the implemented description level policies, two distinct decision tree models were generated for each of the four nonprotected relation instances. One set of models corresponded to the gain attribute selection criterion, while the other set of models corresponded to the gain ratio attribute selection criterion 6]. These two criteria are both supported by C4.5 and provide a decision rule for selecting the interior nodes of a decision tree. Each protected tuple T 0 was evaluated against instances of both models using C4.5's \consult" interpreter 6]. In conducting the experiments, an attribute value was speci ed as unknown if the interpreter requested a protected attribute value.
Experimental Results
The results of the experiments, with respect to nineteen of the twenty-one protected relation instances, are shown in Tables 6 -10. Tables 6 -9 display the average, highest and lowest rank positions of the protected data elements across all nineteen protected relation instances. Speci cally, Tables 6 and 7 display statistics about the rank positions produced by the \consult" interpreter when applied to the individual protected tuples that were generated by the application (description level) protected threshold policies using the OB algorithm. Tables 8 and 9 display the same statistics for the rank positions produced by the \consult" interpreter when applied to the individual protected tuples that were generated from the application (description level) protected rank policies using the OB algorithm. Table 10 displays the percentage of attribute values (among which all but one were nonprotected), belonging to the individual protected tuples, that were mandated to be protected through the execution of the OB algorithm in order to satisfy the various (description level) protected threshold policies and the protected rank policies shown. It is interesting to note that the protected rank policies resulted in a relatively high percentage of protected attribute values as compared to the protected threshold policies.
The recorded rank positions in Table 6 state that a (description space level) protected rank policy that is satis ed by the non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 1], is realizable through the application of a (description level) protected threshold policy de ned at either a threshold value (") of 0.4 or 0.5. In addition, the recorded rank positions indicate that a (description level) protected threshold policy de ned at an "-value other than 0.4 or 0.5 produces an unde nable (description space level) protected rank policy as a result of a maximum recorded rank position of one. The results recorded in Table 7 are almost identical to the results recorded in Table 6 . The only signi cant di erence is that a (description space level) protected rank policy that is satis ed by the non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 1], is realizable through the application of a (description level) protected threshold policy de ned at a threshold value (") of 0.2 as well as 0.4 and 0.5.
The recorded rank positions in Table 8 state that a (description space level) protected rank policy that is satis ed by the non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 1], is realizable through the application of a (description level) protected rank policy de ned with respect to either the non-secure rank range L = 1, U = 2] or L = 1, U = 3]. The remaining (description level) protected rank policies listed in Table 8 produced unde nable (description space level) protected rank policies. Surprisingly, the results recorded in Table 9 are signi cantly di erent from those in Table 8 . In particular, the recorded rank positions in Table 9 state that a (description space level) protected rank policy that is satis ed by the non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 1], is realizable through the application of a (description level) protected rank policy de ned with respect to either the non-secure rank range L = 1, U = 1] or L = 1, U = 3]. Again the remaining (description level) protected rank policies listed in Table 9 produced unde nable (description space level) protected rank policies.
Experimental Conclusions
If the assumption is made that a valid protected rank policy (description space level) is one de ned with respect to a non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 1], then a valid protected rank policy is achievable based on the above results through the application of either a (description level) protected threshold policy de ned at a threshold value (") of approximately 0.45 or a (description level) protected rank policy de ned with respect to the non-secure rank range L = 1, U = 3]. The implementation of the (description level) protected rank policy with a non-secure rank range, L = 1, U = 3], resulted in a substantially higher percentage of protected attribute values having to be hidden than did the implementation of the (description level) protected threshold policy de ned at an "-value of 0.4 or 0.5. We suspect that when a (description level) protected threshold policy is de ned in terms of either a relatively high "-value (0.9, 0.8, 0.7, or 0.6) or a relatively high non-secure rank range ( L = 1, U = 1] or L = 1, U = 2]), the percentage limit on the number of tuples with a class label equal to the protected data element is insu cient to ensure an adequate level of protection at the description space level. On the other hand, description level protected threshold policies de ned in terms of a low "-value (0.3, 0.2, or 0.1) or a low protected rank policy ( L = 1, U = 4]) over protect the protected data element. As a result, the assignment of a class label to a protected tuple is based entirely upon the dominant relationships, or patterns, that exist within the data, independent of the accessible attribute values of the protected tuple.
The two protected relation instances not represented in Tables 6 -10 are exceptions to the notion of a valid (description space level) protected rank policy de ned in terms of a (description level) protected threshold policy or a protected rank policy. Specically, the rank position of the two tuples' protected data element as speci ed by the \consult" interpreter consistently occupied the top position across all implemented (description level) protected threshold and 3.67 1 5 Table 7 protected rank policies. We refer to such protected relation instances as inherently non-secure. In the case of such a relation instance the only logical course of action is to entirely eliminate the protected tuple from the user's view. Our preliminary work (not reported in this paper) in this area indicates that such relation instances are avoidable if the transformation of a non-secure description to a secure description is accomplished by protecting additional attribute values not belonging to the protected tuple (no violation of Condition-1 ); or, such relation instances may be identi able through the application of an alternative predicated class-accuracy measure.
Conclusion and Future Work
The work presented in this paper concerned the accurate assessment of a protected data element's risk of disclosure with respect to the decision-region based classi cation mining algorithms. To that end, a new set of security policies were developed for use in this context along with the speci cation and implementation of a security risk measure that allows for the realization of a subset of the proposed policies. A set of experiments were also conducted in order to validate the overall quality of the proposed approach. Based on the results, we have concluded that a valid security policy is indeed achievable using the approach presented in this paper.
We have several research projects planned with respect to this new and challenging research area. Our immediate plans include, addressing the issue of inherently non-secure relation instances, improvement of the e ciency of the OB algorithm, mapping of continuously valued attributes on to the description space, D , of a protected tuple, and development of additional security measures for other groups of classi cation mining algorithms.
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